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DENISE HOLLADAY DAMICO*

The Cebolleta Land Grant:
Multicultural Cooperation and
Contention
ABSTRACT
Two key moments in the history of the Cebolleta Land Grant—its
establishment and early years in the early nineteenth century, and
efforts to dismantle it in the last decade of that century—allow for
an exploration of the interconnectedness of ethnic identity, a way of
life dependent upon subsistence-level farming and ranching, and the
legal status of the community land grant. The Grant’s history of
multicultural contention and cooperation reveals that ethnic
identity was connected to, but not dependent upon, how individuals
and communities used the land.
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1896, a group of heirs to the Cebolleta Land Grant
published a protest against efforts to divide up or partition the Grant. Doing
so, they argued, would be the ruin of the “Mejicanos” who lived there. It
would leave the people with no place to pasture their sheep; more than that,
it would destroy a way of life, one that was implicitly “Mejicano.” Furthermore, they wrote, those who assisted in the partitioning process, even if
they were of Hispano heritage, did not “deserve the name ‘Mejicano.’”1 The

* Denise Holladay Damico completed her Ph.D. in American History at Brandeis
University in 2008. Her dissertation, “El agua es la vida” (“Water Is Life”): Water Conflict and
Conquest in Nineteenth-Century New Mexico,” uses water disputes to study the U.S.
conquest of New Mexico. She has worked with the Center for Land Grant Studies, in
Guadalupita, N.M., and is currently Visiting Assistant Professor of History at Whitman
College, in Walla Walla, Wash. The author would like to thank Malcolm Ebright, David
Benavides, Mark Schiller, Jessica Lepler, Ken Damico, and Justin Behar for their comments
and suggestions. Portions of the research for this article were funded by the Center for Land
Grant Studies and the New Mexico State Historical Records Advisory Board.
1. Protesta de los Agraciados En la Merced de Cebolleta (Aug. 1, 1896), in L. Bradford
Prince Papers, “Protest of the Grantees of the Cebolleta Grant,” newspaper clipping, Box
13982, folder: Cebolleta Grant—General, pt. 3 of 3 (on file with the N.M. State Records Ctr.
and Archives Santa Fe, N.M., (NMSRCA), and the Natural Resources Journal). A note on
terms: While the heirs to the Cebolleta Land Grant called themselves “Mejicanos” and some
scholars use the term “Nuevomexicanos,” I use the term “Hispano” to refer to people of
Spanish heritage who lived on community land grants like Cebolleta. I use this term because
it is the term most familiar to the majority of New Mexicans I have informally polled in the
classes I have taught at Central New Mexico Community College in Albuquerque.
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authors of the protest linked ethnicity, a way of life, and the status of their
community land grant together. Land grant activists and scholars continue
to emphasize these connections.2
Other recent scholarly works have simultaneously documented
how ethnic identity in New Mexico (and elsewhere) is not a simple
biological fact but rather a creation of historical circumstances.3 The history
of one land grant—Cebolleta— sheds further light on these circumstances
through the prism of one key natural resource, land. Throughout the history
of the Cebolleta Grant, individuals of different ethnicities both cooperated
and came into conflict over land. This paper suggests that ethnic identity
was connected to, but not dependent upon, how individuals and
communities used the land.
Land-use methods helped forge and strengthen ties within a
community like that of the Cebolleta Land Grant and drew neighboring
communities, such as Cebolleta and nearby Laguna Pueblo, together.
However, when individuals, like the people of Cebolleta and local Navajo
bands, held different ideas about how the land should be used, violence
often ensued. Similarly, as the effects of the U.S. conquest of New Mexico
drew some Cebolletans away from the community grant, conflict resulted
among those who still used the land and those who did not.
Because conflict concerning land grants is an ongoing issue in New
Mexico, and often framed in terms of ethnicity, it is easy to impose modernday categories and concepts of land grant communities and culture onto the
past. In particular, scholars have fallen prey to the impulse to romanticize
the communal land grants and the Hispanos who lived on them, portraying
these communities as a unified whole, working together in opposition to

2. For example, Erlinda Gonzales-Berry and David R. Maciel assert, “Because their roots
run deep in the soil, Nuevomexicanos have been able to sustain vital cultural traditions and
to adapt their traditions to conditions of cultural contact with preexisting Native cultures and
also with an external culture that has sought to establish hegemony over Native cultures.”
THE CONTESTED HOMELAND: A CHICANO HISTORY OF NEW MEXICO 2–3 (Erlinda GonzalesBerry & David R. Maciel eds., 2000); see generally LAND, WATER, AND CULTURE: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON HISPANIC LAND GRANTS (Charles L. Briggs & John R. Van Ness eds., 1987);
MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS AND LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO (3d ed. 2008).
3. See generally ROSS FRANK, FROM SETTLER TO CITIZEN: NEW MEXICAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND THE CREATION OF VECINO SOCIETY, 1750–1820 (2000); CHARLES H.
MONTGOMERY, THE SPANISH REDEMPTION: HERITAGE, POWER, AND LOSS ON NEW MEXICO'S
UPPER RIO GRANDE (2002); JOHN M. NIETO-PHILIPS, THE LANGUAGE OF BLOOD: THE MAKING OF
SPANISH-AMERICAN IDENTITY IN NEW MEXICO, 1880S–1930S (2004); PABLO MITCHELL, COYOTE
NATION: SEXUALITY, RACE, AND CONQUEST IN MODERNIZING NEW MEXICO, 1880–1920 (2005);
ANDRÉS RESÉNDEZ, CHANGING NATIONAL IDENTITIES AT THE FRONTIER: TEXAS AND NEW
MEXICO, 1800–1850 (2005).
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Anglo-American encroachment.4 This portrayal does a disservice to the
historical reality of the grantees and heirs of places like Cebolleta.
Cebolleta’s history of multicultural contention and cooperation can
suggest new ways for historians, legal scholars, and land grant activists to
examine the “ethical travesty” of Hispano land loss in ways that are more
complex, but perhaps also more relevant to modern disputes.5 Studying
how grantees and their heirs worked for their own interests does not take
away legitimacy from the ongoing struggles of modern-day heirs and
activists for social justice, but rather allows for an understanding of land
grant communities that fully appreciates how individuals and communities
dealt with one another, their neighbors, and with the Spanish and U.S. legal
systems.
I. THE CEBOLLETA LAND GRANT AND THE SPANISH
COLONIAL PROJECT
Spanish land grants did not take place upon an empty landscape.
The colonists of Cebolleta built their farms and ranches upon land
controlled and used by both Laguna Pueblo and local Navajo bands at
various times. The resulting violence, legal conflicts, and sometime
collaboration molded the Land Grant’s history. Located on the site where
Spanish missionaries failed to convert Navajos to a sedentary, Christian
lifestyle, Cebolleta’s existence was precarious for many years. The Grantees
turned to their neighbors at Laguna Pueblo for assistance during Navajo
raids, even as the Cebolletans and the Pueblo disagreed over the boundary
between them. This interplay of violence and collaboration between

4. For example, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz writes, “Land tenure based on cooperation
characterized the poor communities of New Mexico, while individualism and competition
for material gain characterized the capitalist mode in the United States. ROXANNE DUNBARORTIZ, ROOTS OF RESISTANCE: A HISTORY OF LAND TENURE IN NEW MEXICO 5 (2007). For
interpretations of the American conquest of New Mexico that emphasize a unified Hispano
community who both “resisted” and “accommodated” a unified “Anglo” community, see
generally RODOLFO ACUÑA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: THE CHICANO’S STRUGGLE TOWARD
LIBERATION (1972); DEENA J. GONZÁLEZ, REFUSING THE FAVOR: THE SPANISH-MEXICAN WOMEN
OF SANTA FE, 1820–1880 (1999); Carlos R. Herrera, New Mexico Resistance to U.S. Occupation
During the Mexican-American War of 1846–1848, in THE CONTESTED HOMELAND: A CHICANO
HISTORY OF NEW MEXICO, supra note 2, at 23–58; Anselmo Arellano, The People’s Movement: Las
Gorras Blancas, in THE CONTESTED HOMELAND: A CHICANO HISTORY OF NEW MEXICO, supra note
2, at 23–58.
5. See, e.g., David Benavides, Lawyer-Induced Partitioning of New Mexican Land
Grants: An Ethical Travesty (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Center for Land
Grant Studies, Guadalupita, N.M.).
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Hispanos, Pueblo Indians, and Navajos marks the history of New Mexico
and other colonial spaces. 6
Land grants served the interests of both individual Hispano settlers
and colonial authorities. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, Spanish colonial authorities sought to extend Hispano settlement
of New Mexico beyond the Rio Grande corridor. Individual colonists,
meanwhile, benefitted from the opportunity to acquire land.
In the mid-eighteenth century, some 50 years before the Cebolleta
Land Grant, Spanish colonial authorities first sought to colonize the area by
inducing Navajo families to settle around Catholic missions. Governor
Tomás Vélez Cachupín voiced Spanish colonial policy when he wrote that
he hoped the missions at Cebolleta and nearby Encinal would remodel
Navajo society after the Spanish, “impressing upon them good customs and
community government, in order to displace the uncivilized customs of the
wild barbarians of the desert mountains.”7
In fact, such Spanish efforts were intermittent and proved
unsuccessful.8 The Cebolleta and Encinal missions were the only two of
their kind in New Mexico. Religious and secular authorities’ grandiose
plans for more missions, farther north and west in Navajo country, were
never fulfilled—evidence of the overwhelming military and social control
Navajos maintained in their homeland until the 1860s.9 The Cebolleta and
Encinal missions lasted for less than one year when, in April of 1750, the
Navajos living there forced the Spanish priests to flee.
In all likelihood the very establishment of the missions was due at
least as much to economic as to spiritual motivations on the parts of both
the Spanish and the Navajos. Historian Frank Reeve suggested that Spanish

6. See MARC SIMMONS, THE FIGHTING SETTLERS OF SEBOYETA 19–20 (1971). Simmons
uses one common spelling, “Seboyeta.” I use another common spelling, “Cebolleta” which
is the spelling associated with the Land Grant documents. On violence and collaboration in
New Mexico’s colonial history, see generally JAMES F. BROOKS, CAPTIVES AND COUSINS:
SLAVERY, KINSHIP, AND COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST BORDERLANDS (2002); MALCOLM
EBRIGHT & RICK HENDRICKS, WITCHES OF ABIQUIU: THE GOVERNOR, THE PRIEST, THE GENÍZARO
INDIANS, AND THE DEVIL (2006); RESÉNDEZ, supra note 3. For similar themes in other locations,
see generally NED BLACKHAWK, VIOLENCE OVER THE LAND: INDIANS AND EMPIRES IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN WEST (2006); KAREN ORDAHL KUPPERMAN, INDIANS AND ENGLISH: FACING OFF IN
EARLY AMERICA (2000); JILL LEPORE, NAME OF WAR: KING PHILIP’S WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN IDENTITY (1998); RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND
REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650–1815 (1991).
7. Communication from Tomás Vélez Cachupín to Fray Manuel de San Juan
Nepomuceno y Trigo (Mar. 24, 1750), in 3 HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NEW MEXICO,
NUEVA VIZCAYA, AND APPROACHES THERETO, TO 1773, at 424, 425 (Charles Wilson Hackett ed.
& trans., 1937).
8. Id.
9. See Frank D. Reeve, The Navaho-Spanish Peace: 1720’s–1770’s, 34 N.M. HIST. REV. 9
(1959).
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governor Vélez Cachupín was more interested in trading with the mission
Navajos for skins and baskets than in the state of their souls.10 It also
appears that the only way Spanish priests convinced any Navajos to settle
at the missions was through gifts of hoes and picks, and promises of
“mares, horses, mules, cows, many sheep, and clothing.”11 Though some
Navajos consented to have their children baptized, most apparently agreed
with the sentiment that “they were grown up,” and could not become
Christians or stay in one place because they “had been raised like deer.”12
Furthermore, the people of the growing Pueblo (permanent Native
American settlement) of Laguna also made use of the land around
Cebolleta, cultivating fields there, especially as the Pueblo’s population
increased from about 500 in the mid-eighteenth century to about 1,000 in
the early nineteenth century.13 One friar even asserted that his missionary
work among the Navajo had ceased because the governor had told Laguna
Indians to settle at Cebolleta, in lieu of the Navajos. Perhaps the governor
believed the people of Laguna would be more successful at farming, and
constructing a town and church, since they had a longer history of
accommodation and cooperation with the Spanish.14 Thus Navajos and
Laguna Indians used, and fought over, the Cebolleta area throughout the
eighteenth century.
In fact, by 1769, Laguna had obtained official, Spanish-endorsed
ownership of one tract of land, between the Spanish mission and the
Pueblo, an area later known as the “Paguate Purchase” or “Rancho de
Paguate.” It was likely that the same Spanish governor who had promoted
the Navajo mission, Vélez Cachupín, granted this land to Laguna, though
the original grant documents are not extant.15 Though Laguna Pueblo
officially owned this land, continually possessing and using it would prove
challenging due to Navajo raids and, in the nineteenth century, contention
from the Hispanos at Cebolleta (as shall be further discussed).
In contrast to the missions at Cebolleta and Encinal, the community
land grant proved a far more successful mechanism of the Spanish

10.
11.

Id. at 26.
Auto of Don Bernado Antonio de Bustamente y Tagle (Apr. 18, 1750), in HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NEW MEXICO, NUEVA VIZCAYA, AND APPROACHES THERETO, TO 1773,
supra note 7, at 433–38.
12. Id.
13. Myra Ellen Jenkins, History of Laguna Pueblo Land Claims, in PUEBLO INDIANS IV, at 38
(1974).
14. See Account written by Fray Juan Sanz de Lezaun in the year 1760, in HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NEW MEXICO, NUEVA VIZCAYA, AND APPROACHES THERETO, TO 1773,
supra note 7, at 468, 471–72; See also Jenkins, supra note 13, at 40.
15. However, a document from 1769 does reference the Grant. See Jenkins, supra note 13,
at 41–42.
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colonization of New Mexico in general, and Cebolleta in particular.16 When,
in 1800, several Hispano settlers petitioned the governor in Santa Fe for a
community land grant at Cebolleta, they demonstrated the efficacy of the
Land Grant in unifying the goals of ordinary colonists and governmental
officials. Therefore, Spanish authorities approved the Grant request, and on
March 15, 1800, the local alcalde drew up the official paperwork giving the
Cebolleta Grant to 30 men (heads of household).17
The 30 colonists who asked for the Cebolleta Grant must have been
desperate for land in order to risk establishing a community so far west into
Navajo country. In primarily agrarian New Mexico, wealth came from land
and sheep. Historian Marc Simmons posits that the Cebolleta colonists were
“perhaps in some cases younger sons left out of a paternal inheritance.”18
Other evidence indicates that some of the 30 families—the Baca, Chaves,
and Gallegos families—were descendants of recipients of earlier, private
land grants in the vicinity.19
The earlier grants had been abandoned in the 1780s and 1790s due
to raids from Navajo bands, a fact which surely was not lost to the Cebolleta
settlers. They, and the colonial officials who approved and enacted the
Grant, knew how difficult it would be to maintain a Hispano settlement at
Cebolleta. Therefore, the governor set the condition that the colonists “form
a regular settlement and do not abandon it under any pretext.”20 Granting
officials, in this case Alcalde Aragon, knew that only the threat of losing
their lands might keep colonists in place in the face of Navajo raids. As shall
be discussed, even this threat was not always enough to keep the Grantees
from fleeing in particularly bloody circumstances.
It also seems, given later events, that the colonists and government
authorities alike hoped that the proximity of Laguna Pueblo would provide
a safe haven during the fighting and, perhaps, that Laguna would even help
the Cebolletans fight Navajo raiding parties. Though Laguna and Cebolleta
came into conflict over access to land and water, the people of Laguna
proved willing to provide shelter and help fight Navajo raids alongside
Cebolletans in times of peril. The relationships between the people of

16. There were several large, private land grants in the general vicinity of Cebolleta in
the eighteenth century; however, these were mostly abandoned due to Navajo raids and are
not discussed here. See James F. Brooks, Violence, Justice, and State Power in the New Mexican
Borderlands, 1780–1880, in POWER AND PLACE IN THE NORTH AMERICAN WEST 23 (Richard
White & John M. Findlay eds., 1999); See generally EBRIGHT, supra note 2, at 24–25.
17. Petition for Confirmation of Grant by José Manuel Aragon (Mar. 15, 1800), SG 46,
SANM-I, reel 17, frames 937–38 (English translation on Mar. 16, 1859, SG 46, SANM-I, reel 17,
frame 960) (on file with NMSRCA and the Natural Resources Journal).
18. SIMMONS, supra note 6, at 15.
19. BROOKS, supra note 6, at 210.
20. Petition for Confirmation of Grant by José Manuel Aragon, supra note 17.
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Cebolleta, Laguna Pueblo, and nearby Navajo bands is thus best
understood as a series of dynamic interchanges among the three. Though
Spanish colonization negatively affected the Pueblos by usurping natural
resources and presuming authority, in many cases the later colonial period
saw cooperation between Pueblo Indians and Hispano settlers, especially
in the face of Navajo raids.21
Such conflicts between Navajo raiders and settled Hispano and
Pueblo communities were endemic in nineteenth-century New Mexico, and
were probably exactly what Alcalde Aragon had in mind when he
admonished the Cebolleta Land Grant recipients that they would forfeit
their lands if they abandoned them. As often occurred in colonial New
Mexico, the Cebolletans did in fact leave their Grant very shortly after
receiving it, due to violence with Navajo bands.
Colonial authorities, however, were adamant that the settlers
remain on the Grant, which would provide a key Hispano outpost in
western New Mexico. These governmental officials sent militia troops to
Chihuahua, where the Cebolleta colonists had fled, and marched them back
to Cebolleta under the penalty of death if they refused.22 In this instance the
colonists’ desire for safety diverged with the governmental prerogative to
continue colonizing New Mexico; government authorities temporarily got
their way, but only due to the direct use of force.
The ongoing violence between Navajos and the Hispanos of
Cebolleta exposed fissures between the priorities of the colonial government
and the settlers, who truly must have lived in terror if they were willing to
abandon their land and home. Colonial officials wanted a consistent,
permanent Hispano presence at Cebolleta and did not approve of the
colonists’ choice to leave their Grant. When Governor Fernando Chacon
learned of the colonists’ move and their request to abandon the Grant “on
account of the terror” inspired by the ongoing conflicts with Navajos, he
must have known that he could not permit the colonists to leave Cebolleta.23
He wrote to Alcalde Aragon, who served as an intermediary between the
governor and the colonists, that their actions were “subordination” which
“would require exemplary punishment” to avoid any future repeats
(presumably not only by the Cebolleta colonists but by inhabitants of other
land grants as well).24 The “fugitive” Cebolletans, wrote Governor Chacon,

21. See generally MARC SIMMONS, NEW MEXICO: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 76 (1977).
22. J.J. Bowden, Private Land Claims in the Southwest 1468 (1969) (unpublished LL.M.
thesis, Southern Methodist Univ.) (on file with Univ. of N.M. School of Law Library).
23. Petition for Confirmation of Grant from Fernando Chacon to José Manuel Aragon
(Sept. 26, 1804), SG 46, SANM-I, reel 17, frames 939–40 (English translation at SG 46, SANM-I,
reel 17, frames 963–64) (on file with NMSRCA and the Natural Resources Journal).
24. Id.
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were to immediately “return and reoccupy” their homes and lands.25 If they
did not they would lose any right to their property on the Grant. The
governor also sent 30 soldiers to Cebolleta, probably with the intention of
helping the colonists fight Navajo raiding parties, assuaging the colonists’
fears while reminding them that he could use the military to force them to
return.26
The cycles of raids continued, spurring cooperation between the
colonists and Laguna Pueblo, even as the two growing groups came into
conflict over land. In fact, one attack by Navajos in 1804 was so successful
that it convinced the Cebolleta colonists to actually move into Laguna
Pueblo. Presumably they knew, following the events of 1800–1801, that if
they simply left the Grant entirely the governor would send troops after
them, but safety was a major concern. Likewise, moving into Laguna
Pueblo, which in the early nineteenth century was growing in numbers and
power, must have seemed one of the few options left.27 In 1805 Laguna
tribal members and Cebolletans again fought one major Navajo raid
together. Laguna oral tradition, relayed in a 1904 book written by an Anglo
married to a Laguna woman, holds that Cebolleta formally recognized the
Pueblo’s claim to the tract of land known as the Paguate Purchase in the
1820s, in gratitude for the Pueblo’s assistance in fighting Navajo raids.28
This recognition demonstrates how the Hispanos of Cebolleta had come to
coexist with, and sometimes fight beside, their Laguna Pueblo neighbors
despite ongoing conflict over lands such as the Paguate tract. 29 The threat
of Navajo raids created a unifying force among Pueblo Indians and
Hispanos.
Simultaneously, according to historian James Brooks, Cebolletans
also participated in a “borderlands political economy” of which the cycle of
raids and retaliation were a fundamental component.30 Brooks contends that
this cycle was not random but represented a “system for exacting emotional
retribution and redistributing wealth within and between Navaho and New
Mexican [i.e., Hispano] societies.”31 The ongoing raids and reprisals, he

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Jenkins, supra note 13, at 37–38; Florence Hawley Ellis, Laguna Pueblo, in 9 HANDBOOK
OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 438 (Alfonso Ortiz ed., 1979).
28. Jenkins, supra note 13, at 63–64.
29. Adjudication of the Paguate Purchase continued into the twentieth century and
included the U.S. Supreme Court’s Candelaria opinion and decisions by the Pueblo Lands
Board and the Indian Claims Commission. See Jenkins, supra note 13, at 68–69; Pueblo of
Laguna v. U.S., 17 Ind. Cl. Comm. 615 (1967); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926).
30. Brooks, supra note 16, at 30–31. For his full analysis of New Mexican society through
the prism of a political and moral economy, see BROOKS, supra note 6.
31. Brooks, supra note 16, at 30.
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argues, “actually contributed to the overall growth of both societies”
because it “fostered cultural and economic exchanges” between Hispanos
and Navajos through the continual taking of captives by each group. Brooks
cites the existence of an “enemy” band of Navajo, and a “favored captive”
who was Navajo but raised at Cebolleta in his assertion that this violence
represented an agreed-upon “political and moral economy” that promoted
the expansion of Navajo and Hispano societies alike.32 These cultural
exchanges, however, came at a high price, as the Cebolleta Land Grant’s
early years demonstrate. Even after the colonists re-settled the Grant, deaths
from Navajo raids were frequent.33 It likely would have been difficult to
find anyone among these groups after the raids of the early nineteenth
century who would have agreed that they had anything in common with
“the enemy,” a common descriptor of Navajos in the official Spanish
documents.34 In sum, establishing community land grants like Cebolleta
proved a far more successful policy than missions, in part because they
blended the interests of ordinary Hispanos with those of the government.
However, Navajo bands continued to dispute the Spanish conquest of new
territory, posing a very real threat to those Hispanos of the new
communities, and revealing a conflict in the priorities of colonial officials
and colonists. Cebolleta colonists consequently had to work and coexist
with neighboring Laguna Pueblo in order to survive, during and despite
ongoing tensions with that Pueblo over land use.
Violence between Navajo bands and settled groups, including
Hispanos, Pueblo Indians, and Anglo newcomers would continue
throughout the period of the U.S. conquest of New Mexico. However, this
paper will now turn to a different phase in the Cebolleta Land Grant’s
history—the diverging interests of elites, focusing on the Hispanos, Anglos,
and “Mejicanos” who authored the 1896 protest quoted at the beginning of
this paper. An inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the protest will
reveal that multicultural contention and cooperation continued to shape the
Grant’s history, and the ways in which Cebolletans self-identified.

32. Id.; see also BROOKS, supra note 6.
33. See, e.g., Juan Mariano Peñota, Burial Records, Sept. 1, 1818, Mission of Laguna, N.M.,
certified copy from Nov. 24, 1880, in Amado Chaves Papers (on file with NMSRCA and the
Natural Resources Journal).
34. Petition for Confirmation of Grant from Fernando Chacon to José Manuel Aragon,
supra note 23.
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II. THE CEBOLLETA LAND GRANT AND THE
U.S. COLONIAL PROJECT
The change from Mexican to American sovereignty after the
Mexican-American War (1846–48) brought the priorities of some Cebolleta
Hispanos into conflict with those of Hispano and Anglo elites and
government officials. Cooperation among Hispano and Anglo elites helped
lead to a vast reduction in the size of the Grant, spurring certain Cebolleta
heirs to protest that those who participated in it “did not deserve to be
called Mejicanos.”35 As in the case of the original settling of the Grant, these
Hispanos, both ordinary farmers and elites, were active agents working for
their self-interest. Their interests diverged, however, when heirs who didn’t
live on the Grant cooperated with Hispano elites who, along with certain
Anglos, sought to divide up the Grant and make the land into a commodity.
As other scholars have amply demonstrated, the process by which
the United States government decided upon Mexican and Spanish land
grants in New Mexico was inadequate at best. The focus of customary
Hispano law on the common good of the village, and community control of
certain resources like pasturage and water did not translate to the U.S. legal
system. Anglo entrepreneurs and lawyers often took advantage of this
situation to acquire Hispano and Pueblo lands, a problem compounded by
the fact that Anglo lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats often unabashedly
supported such efforts. Hispanos and Pueblos lost valuable lands and water
rights as a result.36
At first glance, the Cebolleta Land Grant appears to be one of the
more successful in New Mexico. According to the 2004 General Accounting
Office report on community land grants, Cebolleta is third among all
“[n]on-Indian community land grants” in the amount of acreage currently
owned by the community, with 32,000 acres, behind only Antón Chico and
Atrisco.37 Furthermore, the Surveyor General recommended the Grant for
confirmation at the relatively early date of 1861, commenting “the
genuineness of the grant having been established, and the town having been
in existence at the time of the acquisition of New Mexico by the United
States on the 18th day of August 1846, it is presumed there can be no

35. Protesta de los Agraciados En la Merced de Cebolleta, supra note 1.
36. See generally Benavides, supra note 5; EBRIGHT, supra note 2, at 29; RICHARD GRISWOLD
DEL CASTILLO, THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: A LEGACY OF CONFLICT 62–86 (1990).
37. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: FINDINGS AND
POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING COMMUNITY LAND GRANT CLAIMS IN NEW
MEXICO 148 (2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d0459.pdf.
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question of the validity of the claim.”38 The alacrity with which the Surveyor
General recommended the Grant for confirmation was a boon, since delays
in so doing often contributed to land speculation and accelerated land loss.
The Grant was confirmed by Congress as the “Town of Cebolleta” Grant in
1869, and a patent for the Grant, surveyed at just under 200,000 acres, was
issued in January 1882.39 In contrast, most of New Mexico’s land grants
were not confirmed under the U.S. legal system until after the establishment
of the Court of Private Land Claims (CPLC) in 1891.40
Despite these seeming advantages, Cebolleta ultimately lost many
acres of the confirmed land, due to the partitioning of the Grant in the early
twentieth century. Anglo and Hispano elites sought to profit by taking
advantage of the fundamental problem of translating, both literally and
figuratively, legal ownership of land from the Spanish (and Mexican) legal
systems to the U.S. system.41 Partitioning the common lands of a community
grant reflected the assumption shared by many lawyers, judges, and
entrepreneurs of the era: that private land ownership provided the best
method for fully exploiting natural resources, such as land, water, and
timber.42 These attitudes were prevalent among those who were involved
in the partitioning of the Cebolleta Land Grant.
The partitioning proceedings involved both Anglo and Hispano
elites, and some Hispano non-elites. It is true that many individuals in
Territorial New Mexico engaged in corrupt legal practices that helped
contribute to land loss for Hispano communities.43 However, the loss of
land tenure, which occurred among Hispanos following the Mexican War,
cannot be explained solely as the result of the actions of rapacious
individuals, such as Anglo politicians, speculators, and lawyers. Instead, the
legal culture of late nineteenth-century New Mexico, which fostered
individual self-interest over the community good, is as much to blame. As
shall be discussed, those Grant heirs who had little or no connection to the
community of Cebolleta participated in, or at least acquiesced to, the
partition of the Grant. The partition itself was spurred by Anglo and

38. Recommendation of Surveyor General (Oct. 5, 1861), SG 46, SANM-I, reel 17, frame
974 (on file with NMSRCA and the Natural Resources Journal).
39. An Act to Confirm Certain Private Land Claims in the Territory of New Mexico, ch.
152, 15 Stat. 342 (1869) (cited in Bowden, supra note 22, at 1470); Letter from N.C. McFarland
to H.M. Atkinson (Feb. 3, 1882), SG 46, SANM-I, reel 17, frames 998–99 (on file with NMSRCA
and the Natural Resources Journal).
40. See EBRIGHT, supra note 2, at 37–51.
41. For a discussion of the partitioning of land grants, see Benavides, supra note 5; GAO
REPORT, supra note 37, at 151–52.
42. See generally ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND
SOCIETY IN THE GILDED AGE 22–23 (1982).
43. See EBRIGHT, supra note 2, at 37–51.
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Hispano elites who were more connected to the new, cash-based economy.
Those Cebolleta heirs who still lived on or near the Grant and depended
upon its commons for sheep pasturage, on the other hand, worked against
the partition. Ultimately, more than just the actual land would be
divided—so too would the Cebolleta community.
The social and political ties between Hispano and Anglo elites in
Territorial-era New Mexico becomes obvious through an examination of the
correspondence between such elites over the course of the 1890s, as
partitioning proceedings began in the Cebolleta case. These men shared ties
not only to each other, but also to the cash-based economy that the U.S.
conquest of New Mexico had helped to accelerate.
The web of connections between New Mexican elites, Anglo and
Hispano, helps explain many of the apparent “back-room” dealings
involving the Territory’s land grants, like the partitioning of Cebolleta. For
example, New Mexico’s governor from 1889 to 1893, L. Bradford Prince,
was intimately involved in efforts to divide up the Grant. In March of 1892,
he apparently heard some rumors that one key Grant heir, Ramón Baca,
was interested in selling his portion of the Grant. Detecting an opportunity,
he asked Baca’s “nearest friend,” Amado Chaves, about the possibility. 44
In reply, Chaves wrote that Baca did seek a buyer for his portion of the
Cebolleta Land Grant. This letter, and subsequent correspondence on the
matter, indicates that Baca had to sell his land because of unspecified
problems involving his son, which required that he pay “a large sum of
money” at Santa Fe by July 1, 1893.45 It seems likely that Baca’s son was in
some sort of legal trouble, since Prince ascribed Baca’s desire to sell his land
to “the extraordinary misconduct of the son of Mr. Baca, which has
involved the too indulgent father to the extent of over $50,000.”46
Ramón Baca had signed for the government’s patent of the Grant
in 1882, an event that must have seemed like a victory for the community
of Cebolleta.47 Thus Baca must have been, in some ways, a local leader.
However, in seeking to sell his interest in the Grant, Baca also began the

44. The “nearest friend” quote comes from a letter from L. Bradford Prince to S.A. Plumer
(1892), in L. Bradford Prince Papers, supra note 1, at box 13982, folder: Cebolleta
Grant—General, pt. 3 of 3 (on file with NMSRCA and the Natural Resources Journal).
45. Letter from Amado Chaves to L. Bradford Prince (Mar. 25, 1892), in L. Bradford
Prince Papers, supra note 1, at box 13982, folder: Cebolleta Grant—General, pt. 3 of 3 (on file
with NMSRCA and the Natural Resources Journal).
46. Letter from L. Bradford Prince to S.A. Plumer, supra note 44.
47. Wells Fargo & Co. receipt for package containing the patent for the Cebolleta Grant
No. 46 (Apr. 24, 1882), SG 46, SANM-I, reel 17, frame 1002 (on file with NMSRCA and the
Natural Resources Journal). See also Receipt for Patent of Private Land Claim No. 46, the Town
of Cebolleta (Apr. 24, 1882), SG 46, SANM-I, reel 17, frame 1003 (on file with NMSRCA and
the Natural Resources Journal).
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Grant’s partitioning process. These two actions reveal that, like many of
New Mexico’s middle or upper class Hispanos in the late nineteenth
century, Baca occupied a middle space between being tied to the land, and
the Grant, and moving away from those ties toward the cash-based
economy which encouraged land speculation.
Their positions as officers in a group called the New Mexico
Pioneers also bespeak the ways in which Baca, and his friend Amado
Chaves, were familiar with components of both Anglo-American and
Hispano society.48 The New Mexico Pioneers worked to memorialize New
Mexico’s heritage in a way that glorified the area’s Spanish past while
downplaying the role of Native cultures. For example, the Pioneers helped
create monuments to the first Spaniard to conquer New Mexico, Don Juan
de Oñate, and the Spaniard who re-conquered the province following the
Pueblo Revolt, Don Diego de Vargas.49 Emphasizing these Spanish
conquerors helped New Mexicans, particularly Hispano elites, portray their
heritage as similar to that of Anglo-Americans, whose dominant culture
was particularly sensitive to issues of “racial purity” and whiteness at the
turn of the twentieth century.50 The very term “pioneer” is one that
celebrates the conquest of native peoples, and is most often associated with
the Anglo settlement of the West. In embracing the Spanish “pioneer”
tradition, Chaves, Baca, and other Hispano elites sought to forge cultural
ties with the Anglo newcomers. Meanwhile, their actions concerning the
Cebolleta Land Grant helped solidify economic ties with the Anglo elite.
These actions simultaneously harmed the economic and cultural well-being
of the Cebolleta villagers who continued to rely upon the Grant for their
livelihood.
Baca used his connections to Anglo and Hispano elites, and to the
non-elite Cebolleta villagers, as he commoditized the Grant, demonstrating
that Hispanos of all classes were coming more and more under the sway of
a market-based, cash economy in the late nineteenth century. Chaves wrote
that Baca had 175,000 acres in the Grant, a huge amount of land,

48. The Pioneers’ officers are listed on L. Bradford Prince’s letterhead. Letter from L.B.
Prince (Mar. 12, 1898), in L. Bradford Prince Papers, supra note 1, at box 13982, folder:
Cebolleta Grant—Correspondence 1898 (on file with NMSRCA and the Natural Resources
Journal).
49. See Letters from N.M. Pioneers to Felipe Chaves, Chaves Family Papers, box 1, folder
9 (on file with the Center for Southwest Research, Univ. of N.M., Albuquerque, N.M.
(CSWR)).
50. LAURA GÓMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE
(2007); PABLO MITCHELL, COYOTE NATION: SEXUALITY, RACE, AND CONQUEST IN MODERNIZING
NEW MEXICO, 1880–1920 (2005); JOHN NIETO-PHILLIPS, THE LANGUAGE OF BLOOD: THE MAKING
OF SPANISH-AMERICAN IDENTITY IN NEW MEXICO, 1880s–1930s (2004); CHARLES MONTGOMERY,
THE SPANISH REDEMPTION: HERITAGE, POWER, AND LOSS ON NEW MEXICO’S UPPER RIO GRANDE
(2002).
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considering that the entire Grant was only about 200,000 acres.51 Baca had
“bought every interest obtainable,” except for “unknown heirs, persons
disappeared, and the actual settlers of the town of Cebolleta.”52 In other
words, it seems that Baca had bought out those heirs to the Cebolleta Land
Grant who no longer resided on the Grant over the course of the 1860s and
1880s.53 The timing suggests that Baca had probably planned to sell his
“large interest” in the Grant prior to the troubles with his son, and that even
non-elite Hispanos who had no personal stake in the Grant were willing to
sell their shares for money. Baca and these non-elites thus sought to profit
from the land, belying the assumption that only Anglos thought of land as
a commodity in late nineteenth-century New Mexico.
Amado Chaves’s activities in bringing the Cebolleta Grant to
Governor Prince’s attention, and his subsequent involvement, demonstrate
how Hispano and Anglo elites worked together to make money from such
land grant divisions and sales. At Chaves’s suggestion that “this is the best
chance to make a handsome fee that will present itself for a long time,”
Governor Prince began to look for buyers of Baca’s lands. 54 Baca, through
Chaves, had promised Prince a large commission, of either $20,000 or
$25,000. Chaves would get $5000.55 They each could, Chaves wrote, keep a
share of the Grant, presumably for future speculation.56 In fact, by 1905,
Prince had obtained a 20,000 acre share in the Grant, and had found a buyer
from New York City for another large tract of Cebolleta land.57
Prince’s advertisements, presumably circulated among speculators
who might be interested in buying partitioned tracts, confirm that many
Anglo speculators shared assumptions about the lands and natural
resources of New Mexico—that they were commodities, to be bought, sold,
and speculated upon for profit. Prince told potential buyers that the towns
of Cebolleta, Moquino, and Cebolletita “are near at hand and whose people

51. Letter from Amado Chaves to L. Bradford Prince, supra note 45; on the 200,000-acre
figure, see letter from L. Bradford Prince to S.A. Plumer, supra note 44.
52. Letter from L. Bradford Prince to S.A. Plumer, supra note 44.
53. Typed transcriptions of warranty deeds, 1867–85, in L. Bradford Prince Papers, supra
note 1, at box 13982, folder: litigation, 1890–92 (on file with NMSRCA and the Natural
Resources Journal).
54. Letter from Amado Chaves to L. Bradford Prince (Apr. 21, 1892), in L. Bradford
Prince Papers, supra note 1, at box 13982, folder: Cebolleta Grant—General, pt. 3 of 3) (on file
with NMSRCA and the Natural Resources Journal).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Map of the Cebolleta Grant and Subdivisions in the Counties of Valencia, Sandoval,
& McKinley, N.M. (Jan. 18, 1905), in Edmund Ross & Pitt Ross Family Papers, MSS 786 BC,
box 9, oversize (on file with CSWR).
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can supply all of the ordinary labor required on this property.” 58 The
people of these villages, and nearby Juan Tafoya would provide wagebased labor “conveniently and reasonably.”59 Meanwhile, “the tract itself is
absolutely free from any embarrassment,” without “a single squatter upon
it.”60 In other words, by dispossessing the Land Grant heirs of their
inheritance, the prospective Grant buyers would also ensure themselves of
a ready-made pool of workers for wage labor, including workmen and
sheepherders. People who had once herded their own sheep would now do
so for others, perhaps under the partidario system, somewhat akin to
sharecropping.61
Interestingly, Chaves also shared these ideas, suggesting that they
were not confined to Anglos. Both Prince and Chaves emphasized the ready
availability of commodities such as cattle and timber on the Cebolleta
Grant, demonstrating their knowledge that potential buyers were interested
in the amount of profit they could wring from the land. At the suggestion
of Chaves, Prince urged one buyer to go to the grant and see Ramón Baca’s
cattle, writing, “you can judge from them better than any other way, of the
character of the tract for grazing.”62 Chaves also noted that the majority of
the Grant was made up of “excellent grazing land” which was “well
watered for livestock.”63 He went so far as to say that “the pasturage all
over the grant is equal to the best in the Territory.”64
Prince and Chaves viewed the timber on the Grant as an important
selling point, telling buyers that there were between 35,000 and 45,000 acres
of “timber land, pine and spruce” with timber worth $5.50 per acre.65 In one
note Chaves wrote that a “Michigan expert” had estimated there to be “5000
feet of good lumber to the acre saying nothing of the tie and telegraph
poles.” 66 The railroad and accompanying telegraph ran through the area a
few miles south of the Grant, providing a ready market for railroad ties and
telegraph poles, and also demonstrating the interconnections between the

58. See L. Bradford Prince, “First Class Grazing Land in New Mexico,” in L. Bradford
Prince Papers, supra note 1, at box 13983, folder: Cebolleta Grant—Maps) (on file with
NMSRCA and the Natural Resources Journal).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. JOHN O. BAXTER, LAS CARNERADAS: SHEEP TRADE IN NEW MEXICO (1700–1860), at
28–30, 94–95 (1987).
62. Letter from L. Bradford Prince to S.A. Plumer, supra note 44.
63. Letter from Amado Chaves to L. Bradford Prince, supra note 54.
64. Description and approximate value of the Cebolleta Land Grant by Amado Chaves,
in L. Bradford Prince Papers, supra note 1, at box 13982, folder: Cebolleta Grant—General, pt.
3 of 3 (on file with NMSRCA and the Natural Resources Journal).
65. Letter from Amado Chaves to L. Bradford Prince, supra note 54.
66. Description and approximate value of the Cebolleta Land Grant by Amado Chaves,
supra note 64.
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commoditization of land, the movement of individuals from rural farms to
cities, and the coming of corporate railroads to the Territory. As Chaves
wrote, “There is always a good demand for lumber owing to the rapid
development of our towns and cities, aside from the large amount
demanded by the Rail-Road companies, which are continually building new
lines.”67
Once the timber had been cut, Chaves wrote, the resultant fields
could “be subjected to agricultural uses without much irrigation, and a very
large portion can be irrigated there being an abundance of water for such
purposes.”68 He also predicted, “there are several thousand acres that can
be cultivated and will produce the finest potatoes and oats without
irrigation.”69
Chaves’s statement that once Prince actually saw the property he
would “be convinced that it is worth one million dollars” reveals the ethic
shared by Prince and Chaves that exploiting the natural resources on the
Grant would provide a profit.70 This ethic was thus not confined to Anglos,
but shared by New Mexican elites. Boosters like Prince and Chaves always
went to great pains to demonstrate that the land had not been fully
exploited and ample opportunities remained. To this end, Chaves or Prince
[the authorship of this document is unclear] wrote of Cebolleta, “There are
some minerals on the grant but not developed but there is any quantity of
coal in some portion of the grant.” This coal would have a ready market for
it was “not far from the R.R. About 15 miles.”71
Though these Hispano and Anglo elites worked together, the heirs
of the Cebolleta Land Grant who sought to thwart their efforts cast the issue
as an ethnic one. In the aforementioned “Protest” published in 1896 in a
Spanish-language newspaper, the commissioners of the Cebolleta Grant, on
behalf of all heirs to the Grant, asserted that the division of the community
grant into parcels of private property would mean “the ruin and death of
the Mexican community that lives on or around the grant.”72
It might seem that the differences between those Hispanos like
Chaves and Baca who sought to partition the Grant, and those, like the
Cebolleta Grant commissioners who fought this partition, were class-based.
The commissioners, however, disagreed, arguing that all the people on the

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Letter from Amado Chaves to L. Bradford Prince, supra note 54.
70. Id.
71. Description of Cebolleta Land Grant, in L. Bradford Prince Papers, supra note 1, box
13982, folder: Cebolleta Grant—General, pt. 3 of 3 (on file with NMSRCA and the Natural
Resources Journal).
72. Protesta de los Agraciados En la Merced de Cebolleta, supra note 1.
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Grant were “Mejicanos,” including both “rich and poor” in “our Mexican
people.”73
The commissioners’ protest asserted that rich and poor Mejicanos
all made a living from their sheep.74 Perhaps the commissioners viewed
sheep herding as the prerequisite to being “Mejicano,” as opposed to newer
ways of making a living, such as being a lawyer or a public official with the
U.S. government (like Amado Chaves). If the Grant were robbed from them,
the commissioners asked, where would they pasture the animals in
question? The larger question was really, how would their way of life
survive? Losing the communal lands would mean “the ruin and death of
the Mexican community that lives on or near the grant.”75 Perhaps this is
why the commissioners declared that the “cowards” and “worshippers of
money and injustice” who worked for the division, presumably meaning
Ramón Baca, “do not deserve the name of ‘Mejicanos.’”76
This protest was likely written in response to the fact that attorneys
were preparing the case to go before the special master, which it did in the
spring of 1897. By this time, Amado Chaves and L. Bradford Prince appear
to have been working on opposite sides, but this appearance can be
deceiving. Chaves worked with an attorney named Frank Clancy,
supposedly on behalf of the Cebolleta Land Grant heirs.77 However, the fact
that Chaves had initially been the one to approach Prince with Baca’s offer
to sell the majority of the Grant, and the fact that Clancy ended up with a
large tract of land in the Grant, indicate that these attorneys did not
necessarily work purely for their clients’ best interests.78
The proceedings dragged on for years, and in fact it was not until
1907 that much of the Grant was partitioned, opening the gateway for a
variety of interests to come onto the Grant lands.79 Only 32,000 acres of the
original 199,567.92 acres confirmed to the Town of Cebolleta are today

73. Id.
74. “Nuestro pueblo Mejicano vive de [illeg.] ovejas, ricos y pobres.” Id.
75. “Tal division significa la ruina y la muerte del pueblo Mejicano que vive dentro ó al
rededor de la merced.” Id.
76. “Los cobardes, aduladores del dinero y de la injusticia, no merecen el nombre de
Mehicanos.” Id.
77. Letter from Frank W. Clancy to Amado Chaves, Albuquerque, N.M. (June 14, 1903),
in Amado Chaves Papers, box 1, folder 5 (on file with NMSRCA and the Natural Resources
Journal).
78. Map of the Cebolleta Grant and Subdivisions in the Counties of Valencia, Sandoval,
& McKinley, N.M., supra note 57.
79. “Cutting” regarding Cebolleta Land Grant (possibly 1897), newspaper clipping from
an Albuquerque newspaper, enclosed in letter from Lionel H. Graham to L. Bradford Prince
(Jan. 17, 1898), in L. Bradford Prince Papers, supra note 1, at box 13982, folder: Cebolleta
Grant—Correspondence 1898) (on file with NMSRCA and the Natural Resources Journal);
Baca v. Anaya, 14 N.M. 382 (1908).
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owned by the Grant.80 Thus the Cebolleta partition was unique in that most,
but not all, of the community land grant went into private hands.81 One
map, drawn in 1905 during the partition proceedings, sheds some light on
how this may have occurred. The map divides most of the Grant into nine
tracts of land. Two of the nine tracts, according to the map, were owned by
“Cebolleta people.”82 The smaller is the Juan Tafoya Land Grant, another
Grant that was within the boundaries of Cebolleta, as confirmed by
Congress and surveyed by the U.S. government.83 The larger tract
comprised 16,693 acres.84
Five tracts were owned by individuals or groups, including L.B.
Prince and the buyer he had found, A.L. Richardson. Three others were
owned (or partially owned) by lawyers.85 Two of the three lawyers, Frank
Clancy and Raynolds, were definitely involved in the partition proceedings.
Clancy was the attorney who worked with Amado Chaves to find and
collect deeds to the Grant, as described above; Raynolds also assisted
Clancy and Chaves.86 It also seems likely the third owner, prominent
Albuquerque attorney B.S. Rodey, was involved in the partitioning as well.
One tract is listed as “land to be sold,” and one is ascribed to
“unassigned owners.”87 It seems possible that one of these tracts, listed at
14,421 acres, was eventually purchased by, or otherwise came back into the
ownership of the Town of Cebolleta Grant. This, combined with the 16,693
acres owned by the town would make for approximately the amount owned
by the community land grant today, some 32,000 acres.
The partition thus led to private control over large parts of the
Grant, with a uranium mining company leasing the majority of the lands

80. GAO REPORT, supra note 37; See also Receipt for Patent of Private Land Claim No. 46,
the Town of Cebolleta (Apr. 24, 1882), SG 46, SANM-I, reel 17, frame 1003) (on file with
NMSRCA and the Natural Resources Journal).
81. David Benavides & Ryan Golten, Righting the Record: A Response to the GAO’s 2004
Report “Treaty of Guadlupe Hidalgo: Findings and Possible Options Regarding Longstanding
Community Land Grant Claims in New Mexico,” 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 857, (2008).
82. Map of the Cebolleta Grant and Subdivisions in the Counties of Valencia, Sandoval,
& McKinley, N.M., supra note 57.
83. On the Juan Tafoya Land Grant, see Petition and Protest (of Juan Tafoya Grantees and
heirs) (Feb. 5, 1885), SG 46, SANM-I, reel 17, frames 1005–11) (on file with NMSRCA and the
Natural Resources Journal); Juan Tafoya Land Grant v. Baca, 498 P.2d 673 (1972); Marquez
v. Juan Tafoya Land Corp., 632 P.2d 738 (1981).
84. GAO REPORT, supra note 37.
85. Id.
86. Letter from Frank W. Clancy to Amado Chaves, supra note 77.
87. GAO REPORT, supra note 37.
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and causing immeasurable environmental consequences to the town of
Cebolleta and surrounding communities.88
Despite these challenges, the Land Grant of Cebolleta remains
extant. Today, heirs of this Grant and many others continue to struggle for
social and environmental justice. As they seek a balance between individual
ownership of land and the well-being of the community, the long history of
individuals of all ethnicities working for their own self-interests adds
additional perspective to these struggles. All of these individuals made
choices that, while certainly informed by their cultural background, were
not necessarily dictated by that background. A full accounting of the
multicultural interactions in the Grant’s history might help chart the course
toward increased cooperation among those of all ethnicities who seek to
preserve New Mexico’s land grants in the future.

88. Sarah Maestas to Cebolleta Land Grant Committee (Aug. 16–17, 2004), Grants, N.M.;
Moquino Community Gets Involved in Uranium Mill Tailings Decision, VOICES FROM THE EARTH,
Spring 2004, available at http://www.sric.org/voices/2004/v5n1/moquino.html.

